1. Motivation of the proposed theme in the current scientific context:

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The main goal of our project is to reconstruct the conceptions of perceptual intentionality developed at Oxford, in the thirteenth century, by three Franciscans, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Adam of Buckfield, and John Pecham, and a secular, Geoffrey of Aspall.

The secondary goal is to determine the potential interactions between these conceptions and the contemporary conceptions of intentionality. Here are the whys of the planned research.

 

1.1 Limitations of the current approaches:

 

Intentionality is unquestionably one of the most effervescent topics in the contemporary history of medieval philosophy. Its investigation, however, is not without shortcomings. Two are particularly noticeable:
I. The medieval conceptions of intentionality are frequently approached as counterparts of contemporary conceptions, being thus confined to the level of intellectual acts. Even when historians acknowledge that, in medieval philosophy, intentionality was conceived as a much broader phenomenon, pertaining to sense perception or inanimate beings, they rarely dig deeper to understand and explain this specificity. Most of the time, we encounter the following account: Sense perception, for instance, is intentional because it has intentional content. And this is correct. But how is such content acquired by the subject of perception? Despite appearances, this question, in this case, is not philosophical, but historical. To answer it, the historian has therefore to dig deeper at the roots of medieval conceptions of intentionality, that is, to reconstruct their frameworks.
II. The investigation of the medieval conceptions of intentionality is narrowed down even further
by being focused on the so-called ‘major’ philosophers, such as Aquinas, Scotus, or Ockham. When other philosophers, such as Kilwardby, Fishacre, or Sutton, inevitably dubbed as ‘minor,’ are
considered, their conceptions are usually reconstructed as leading to, on the same path as, or derived from the conceptions of the ‘major’ philosophers. Not quite worthy of being reconstructed in their own right, these conceptions are thus disregarded as ‘minor’ conceptions. Consequently, the research outcomes of such investigations of the medieval treatment of intentionality are incomplete and, at times, even inaccurate.

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1.2 Importance of the issue from a scientific and cultural point of view:

 

The general presupposition behind the assessment above is that a certain philosophical conception cannot be properly approached and reconstructed by considering only some of its aspects or by isolating it from other, eventually more fundamental, conceptions. The same holds for philosophies in general: One of them cannot be properly approached and reconstructed by considering only some of its aspects or by isolating it from other philosophies. It is thus in compliance with this general presupposition that we set out to reconstruct the conceptions of intentionality advanced by Rufus, Buckfield, Pecham, and Aspall.

The thirteenth-century Oxford was chosen for its fertility and relevance as a philosophical milieu,
freed from Paris’s shadow, investigated in its own right, and thus rediscovered in the contemporary history of philosophy. As for the ‘minor’ philosophers, it is our contention that they should better be dubbed as ‘insufficiently investigated’ philosophers. One of the conclusions of the PL’s up to now research is that the work of the ‘insufficiently investigated’ thirteenth-century Oxford philosophers is undoubtedly worthwhile. In a best case scenario, the ways in which some of them conceived intentionality can prove truly important and even innovative; in a worst case scenario, investigating such philosophers provides context and thus furthers our understanding of the general discussions about intentionality. In order to avoid the two aforementioned shortcomings mentioned above, we will approach and reconstruct the targeted conceptions of intentionality by paying close attention to both their details and their frameworks. To be more precise, we will investigate how these conceptions, with all their details, are determined by their metaphysical and epistemological frameworks. The gain of such an approach is double. On the one hand, the philosophies of the past recover a consistent part of their lost autonomy, and the history of philosophy is reaffirmed as a discipline in its own right (de Libera 2010, Garber 2003, Marenbon 2018). On the other hand, contemporary philosophy finds in the philosophies of the past a challenging dialogue partner, one that forces it to evolve by questioning its most fundamental presuppositions (Antognazza 2015, Perler 2018, Rapp 2018). Consequently, philosophical knowledge in general gains amplitude and robustness.

 

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1.3 Difficulty elements of the issue:

 

Given the main goal of our project, two fundamental obstacles stand in the way of our planned research. The first can be called ‘subjective’ and consists of anachronism, that is, the habit of not paying enough attention to the fact that the historical distance between our world and the medieval world entails significant differences between the ways we think today and the ways medievals used to think. These differences pertain to the presuppositions of thinking, to the raised questions and the answers to these questions, to the arguments supporting the answers, to the used concepts and distinctions. What is thus needed to not fall prey to anachronism is historical vigilance. We have to be ready to receive the alterity of the targeted conceptions of perceptual intentionality and to understand it properly. The second obstacle can be called ‘objective’ and consists of literature scarcity. Fortunately, many of the works of the four Oxonians are already edited, and those that are not are available in manuscript form. Unfortunately, there is not much literature on these works. Most of the scholarship on Rufus is part of a single research undertaking, The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project. His conceptions of metaphysics and perceptual intentionality are only tangentially discussed in a couple of Wood’s (2007, 2019) and Etchemendy’s (2011) papers. Callus (1939), as part of his work on the early British philosophers, wrote on Buckfield. More recently, O’Donnell (1955), Galle (2008a, 2008b, 2010), Brumberg-Chaumont and Poirell (2021) edited and commented on some of his works, and French wrote a Ph.D. thesis on his natural philosophy. The scholarship is, however, still in its infancy, and there are no papers discussing his conception of perceptual intentionality. Coming to Pecham, the secondary literature is mainly due to Ehrle (1889), Lindberg (1972), and Wilson (1998), being focused on his natural philosophy and his criticism of Aquinas’ position on the unity of the soul. With one exception (Mantovani 2019), Pecham’s conception of perceptual intentionality is not among the main topics of contemporary scholarship. Finally, the existing scholarship on Aspall, done by Plevano (1993), Donati (2012, 2013), and Trifogli (2018), focuses on his natural philosophy, especially his theory of matter and motion. Unfortunately, his conception of the intentionality of perception remains still a largely neglected topic.
Given the secondary goal of our project, the main difficulty for our research consists in assessing
the possible level of interaction between the medieval and contemporary conceptions of intentionality. However, once the main goal of our project is reached, the level of difficulty of the second goal will drop significantly. There will be nothing left but to compare the items under consideration, that is, the rigorously reconstructed medieval conceptions and the contemporary conceptions, which have been at the center of contemporary philosophical research.

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2. Elements of innovation and originality:

 

From what has been said until now, it should be quite obvious that the project contains both innovative and original elements. They pertain to the issue under investigation, as well as to the manner in which it is investigated. 

2.1 Innovative aspects:

The planned research is innovative in its way of doing the history of philosophy. It is guided by the aim of restoring the autonomy of the medieval conceptions of perceptual intentionality. With this aim in mind, the medieval theories will be approached and reconstructed not by interpreting them as counterparts of contemporary conceptions, but by reintegrating them into their own, original, frameworks. The medieval conceptions of perceptual intentionality are part of philosophies that have their own metaphysical and epistemological frameworks; the philosophies are part of a philosophical milieu bringing together philosophers we already know well and philosophers we could know better. By taking into account this perspective, the contemporary historian can help medieval philosophy speak for itself. It is in this way that its interaction with contemporary philosophy can become truly fruitful, crossing old boundaries and bringing about new knowledge.

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2.2. Original aspects:

 

The planned research is original due to its very topic. Up to now, there are no studies centered on the conceptions of perceptual intentionality developed by Rufus, Buckfield, Pecham, or Aspall. By focusing on them, our work brings to the fore mainstream philosophical ideas of thirteenth-century Oxford and restores the lost, but the well-deserved, place of the four authors in the history of philosophy. The comparison between medieval conceptions and contemporary ones just adds another layer to the originality of the project. From this perspective, too, the planned research crosses old boundaries and brings about new knowledge. 

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3. Objectives, methodology, and work plan:

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3.1. The concrete scientific objectives of the project:

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As stated above, the project has two goals, the main one and a secondary one. Here are the hows of the planned research. The main goal is to reconstruct, by paying close attention to their metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, the conceptions of perceptual intentionality developed by Rufus, Buckfield, Pecham, and Aspall. To achieve this goal, our background hypothesis is the following: What structures the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, and what is of utmost importance for a proper approach and reconstruction of the conceptions of perceptual intentionality, is the concept of form and the extent to which it allows for a hierarchy of forms. We discern two main medieval interpretations with respect to perception:

I. There is no ontological difference between forms in general. Therefore, the form of a corporeal
object can be transferred to the form of a human subject, that is, to its soul.
II. The form of a corporeal object is ontologically inferior to the form of a human subject. Given that, for all four medieval philosophers under consideration here, what is inferior cannot act on what is superior, and the form of a corporeal object cannot be transferred to the form of a human subject.

According to the first interpretation, the transfer of the form of a corporeal object, which becomes
the intentional content of a perceptual act is possible and sufficient to account for perceptual intentionality. According to the second interpretation, the transfer of the form of a corporeal object to a human subject is impossible. To possess a content similar to the form of a corporeal object, that is, to possess an intentional content, the subject needs to perform a prior intentional act, namely to direct its attention towards the outside world and to construct, out of itself, an image similar to the form of a corporeal object. The performance of this prior intentional act is not due to the interaction with a corporeal object, but due to the teleology of the soul.

Following the background hypothesis, the main goal is broken down into three scientific objectives (SO):
SO1: Analyse and reconstruct the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks of the conceptions of perceptual intentionality developed by the four Oxonian philosophers.

SO2: Using the data gathered while working on SO1, analyse and reconstruct the conceptions of
perceptual intentionality developed by the four Oxonian philosophers.
SO3: Using the data gathered while working on both SO1 and SO2, map the correspondences
between the stances on the concept of form and the conceptions of perceptual intentionality
developed by the four Oxonian philosophers.
 

The secondary goal is to determine the potential interactions between the reconstructed conceptions and the contemporary conceptions of intentionality. Following the aforementioned background hypothesis, contemporary conceptions can be selected according to the role they attribute to the intentional content. Thus, the intentional content can be seen as the one triggering the perceptual intentional act, as in the analytic philosophy of mind (for example, Searle 1983), or as being the result of a more fundamental form of intentionality, according to some interpretations in phenomenology (for example, Drummond 2012). However, all these, and more, remain to be properly determined while working on the last objective of our project:
SO4: Using the data gathered at SO1-SO3, determine (a) how the reconstructed conceptions could interact with the contemporary conceptions of intentionality, (b) which are the contemporary conceptions to be considered, and (c) what are the directions of such interaction.

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3.2. Investigation methods:

 

The autonomy claimed for the history of medieval philosophy should not be perceived as a form of isolationism. In the process of reconstructing the targeted conceptions of perceptual intentionality, we will also use tools provided by contemporary philosophy.
SO1 to SO4 – analytic methodology consisting in identifying and assessing the presuppositions, questions, answers, arguments, concepts, and distinctions at work in the texts dealt with.
SO1 to SO4 – philological and palaeographical methodology consisting in decoding and interpreting Latin texts, studying manuscripts, and transcribing them.
SO1 and SO2 – historical methodology consisting in uncovering and investigating the sources of certain ideas developed by certain philosophers, the manner in which the sources were approached, and the historical milieu in which the ideas were developed.
SO3 and SO4 – comparative methodology consisting in identifying the similarities and dissimilarities between the compared items, and assessing their level of compatibility.
 

3.3. Work strategy and work plan:

 

The project has four main work packages (WP) whose presentation includes their respective main objective (O), the specific tasks to be carried out (T), the expected major deliverables (D), and the intermediary key goals or milestones charting the progress of the research (M). The time allotted for each WP will be stated in months (m). Each WP will mention the members involved in their implementation: project leader (PL), postdoc medieval philosophy (P1), postdoc contemporary philosophy (P2), PhD student (S); where the whole research team is involved (RT). The Gantt chart summarizes the work plan.

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WP1: Scientific (m: 1-24)
Objective: Reconstruct, by paying close attention to their metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, the conceptions of perceptual intentionality developed by Rufus, Buckfield, Pecham, and Aspall, and determine the potential interactions between these conceptions and the contemporary conceptions of intentionality. This work package, the most substantial of the project, is broken down into four specific work packages:
WP1.1: The metaphysics and epistemology of the conceptions of perceptual intentionality (m: 1-8)
Objective: Achieve SO1. Tasks: T1.1.1: Trace the historical sources of the particular configurations of the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks (m: 1-4, P1, S); T1.1.2: Analyse how the concept of form determines the identity of things in general and their possibilities to develop relations, by focusing on the conceptions of hylomorphism, teleology, and the soul and its powers (m: 5-6, PL, P1); T1.1.3: Analyse how forms make it possible for things to be objects or subjects, and how perception comes about, by focusing on the criteria for cognition and on whether these criteria endorse a passive or an active conception (m: 7-8, PL, P1); T1.1.4: Write the first section of the planned monograph (m: 1-8, PL); T1.1.5: Write two articles on the topic of SO1 (m: 1-8, PL, P1); T1.1.6: Participate in two international conferences with papers on the topic of SO1 (m: 1-8, PL, P1). Deliverables: D1.1.1: Draft of the first section of the monograph (m: 8, PL); D1.1.2: Draft of the first articles (m: 8, PL, P1). Milestone: M1.1: Assess, with the research team, the results of the work on SO1 (m: 8).
WP1.2: The actual conceptions of perceptual intentionality (m: 9-16)
Objective: Achieve SO2. Tasks: T1.2.1: Trace the historical sources of the particular conceptions
of perceptual intentionality (m: 9-11, P1, S); T1.2.2: Analyse the conceptions of perceptual intentionality: T1.2.2.1; Identify their basic ingredients (m: 12-14, PL, P1); T1.2.2.2: Identify the relations between their basic ingredients (m: 15-16, PL, P1); T1.2.3: Write the second section of the monograph (m: 9-16, PL); T1.2.4: Participate to two international conferences with papers on the topic of SO2 (m: 9-16, PL, S). Deliverables: D1.2.1: Submit the articles from T1.1.5 to a top-tier journal, such as JHP, BJHP, or Vivarium (m: 9, PL, P1); D1.2.2: Draft of the second section of the monograph (m: 16, PL). Milestone: M1.2: Assess, with the research team, the results of the work on SO2 (m: 16).
WP1.3: The concept of form and the conceptions of perceptual intentionality (m: 17-24)

Objective: Achieve SO3. Tasks: T1.3.1: Compare and assess the conceptions of perceptual intentionality: T1.3.1.1: Focus on the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks (m: 17-18, RT); T1.3.1.2: Focus on their basic ingredients (m: 19-20, RT); T1.3.1.3: Focus on the relations between the basic ingredients (m: 21, RT); T1.3.2: Participate in an international conference with a paper on the topic of SO3 (m: 17-20, PL); T1.3.3: Write the third section of the monograph (m: 17-22, PL); T1.3.4: Write an article on the topics of SO2 and SO3 (m: 17-22, PL). Deliverables: D1.3.1: Draft of the third section of the monograph (m: 22, PL); D1.3.2: Submit the article from T1.3.4 to a top-tier journal, such as JHP, BJHP, or Vivarium (m: 23, PL). Milestone: M1.3: Assess, with the research team, the results of the work on SO3 (m: 24).
WP 1.4: Contemporary conceptions of perceptual intentionality (m: 12-24)
Objective: Achieve SO4. Tasks: T1.4.1: Determine how the medieval conceptions could interact with contemporary ones, by identifying the necessary common elements that would make interaction possible (m: 12-15, P2); T1.4.2: Identify and analyse the types of contemporary conceptions that fit the interaction by focusing on the role they attribute to the intentional content (m: 16-20, P2); T1.4.3: Compare the medieval with the contemporary conceptions and build a map of their interaction by taking into account their metaphysical and epistemological elements (m: 20-24, RT); T1.4.4: Write an article on the topic of SO4 (m: 17-22, P2); T1.4.5: Participate to an international conference with a paper on the topic of SO4 (m: 18-22, P2). Deliverables: D1.4: Submit the article from T1.4.4 to a top-tier journal (m: 23, P2). Milestone M1.4: Assess, with the research team, the results of the work on SO4 (m: 24).
WP 2: Dissemination, exploitation, communication, and specific outputs (m: 1-24)
Objective: Disseminate and communicate the activities and the results of the project. Ensure the
maximum exploitation and communication of the outputs through online and printed advertisements. Tasks: T2.1: Lay the groundwork for the international workshop (m: 4-13, RT); T2.2: Produce four podcasts mirroring the scientific objectives of the project (m: 8, 16, 22, 24, RT); T2.3: Organize four reading groups on (1) Rufus (2) Buckfield, (3) Pecham, and (4) Aspall (m: 1-22, PL); T2.4: Review the website’s traffic and feedback indicators (m: 8, 14, 18, 22, S); T.2.5 Invite four specialists in medieval philosophy (m: 1-3, PL). Deliverables: D2.1: Launch the website and the electronic newsletter (m: 4, S); D2.2: Organize the international workshop (m: 13, RT); D2.3: Organize the lectures of the invited guests (m: 6, 10, 14, 20, RT); D2.4: Submit the collected volume to a top-tier academic press, such as Brill, Springer, or Routledge (m: 24, PL). * To avoid overlaps, the deliverables resulting from the scientific work packages, though pertaining to the dissemination phases of the project, are only mentioned in WP 1.

WP 3: Research stays (m: 4-5, 13-14, 19-20)
Objective: Increase the bibliography, receive feedback on the research, and extend the network of collaborators. Tasks: T3.1: Research stay at the University of Oxford (m: 4-5, P1, S): T3.1.1:
Discuss the metaphysical and epistemological frameworks of the targeted conceptions of intentionality with Professor Trifogli (m: 4-5, P1, S); T3.1.2: Field trips to libraries in London and Cambridge (m: 4, P1, S); T3.2: Research stay at Humboldt University of Berlin (m: 19-20, PL); T3.2.1: Discuss the details of the monograph on perceptual intentionality with Professor Perler (m:19-20, PL); T3.2.3: Present the research project and its up-to-date results to Berlin scholars (m: 21, PL); T3.3: Research stay at the University of Oxford (m:13-14, P2); T3.3.1: Discuss with Professor Zahavi and Professor Trifogli about perceptual intentionality in medieval philosophy and in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (m: 13-14, P2).